CVE-2024-26727: btrfs: do not ASSERT() if the newly created subvolume already got read

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

btrfs: do not ASSERT() if the newly created subvolume already got read

[BUG]
There is a syzbot crash, triggered by the ASSERT() during subvolume
creation:

assertion failed: !anon_dev, in fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:1319
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:1319!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
RIP: 0010:btrfs_get_root_ref.part.0+0x9aa/0xa60

btrfs_get_new_fs_root+0xd3/0xf0
create_subvol+0xd02/0x1650
btrfs_mksubvol+0xe95/0x12b0
__btrfs_ioctl_snap_create+0x2f9/0x4f0
btrfs_ioctl_snap_create+0x16b/0x200
btrfs_ioctl+0x35f0/0x5cf0
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x19d/0x210
do_syscall_64+0x3f/0xe0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

[CAUSE]
During create_subvol(), after inserting root item for the newly created
subvolume, we would trigger btrfs_get_new_fs_root() to get the
btrfs_root of that subvolume.

The idea here is, we have preallocated an anonymous device number for
the subvolume, thus we can assign it to the new subvolume.

But there is really nothing preventing things like backref walk to read
the new subvolume.
If that happens before we call btrfs_get_new_fs_root(), the subvolume
would be read out, with a new anonymous device number assigned already.

In that case, we would trigger ASSERT(), as we really expect no one to
read out that subvolume (which is not yet accessible from the fs).
But things like backref wa...

Classification

CVE ID: CVE-2024-26727

Affected Products

Vendor: Linux

Product: Linux

Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)

EPSS Score: 0.04% (probability of being exploited)

EPSS Percentile: 12.38% (scored less or equal to compared to others)

EPSS Date: 2025-02-03 (when was this score calculated)

References

https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3f5d47eb163bceb1b9e613c9003bae5fefc0046f
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e31546b0f34af21738c4ceac47d662c00ee6382f
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/66b317a2fc45b2ef66527ee3f8fa08fb5beab88d
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/833775656d447c545133a744a0ed1e189ce61430
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5a172344bfdabb46458e03708735d7b1a918c468
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e03ee2fe873eb68c1f9ba5112fee70303ebf9dfb

Timeline