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Description: Vulnerability type
XSS
Description
vue-i18n can be passed locale messages to createI18n or useI18n.
we can then translate them using t and $t.
vue-i18n has its own syntax for local messages, and uses a message compiler to generate AST.
In order to maximize the performance of the translation function, vue-i18n uses bundler plugins such as @intlify/unplugin-vue-i18n and bulder to convert the AST in advance when building the application.
By using that AST as the locale message, it is no longer necessary to compile, and it is possible to translate using the AST.
The AST generated by the message compiler has special properties for each node in the AST tree to maximize performance. In the PoC example below, it is a static property, but that is just one of the optimizations.
About details of special properties, see https://github.com/intlify/vue-i18n/blob/master/packages/message-compiler/src/nodes.ts
In general, the locale messages of vue-i18n are optimized during production builds using @intlify/unplugin-vue-i18n,
so there is always a property that is attached during optimization like this time.
But if you are using a locale message AST in development mode or your own, there is a possibility of XSS if a third party injects.
Reproduce (PoC)
vue-i18n XSS
/**
* Prototype pollution vulnerability with `Object.prototype`.
* The 'static' property is part of the optimized AST generated by the vue-i18n message compiler.
* About...
December 3rd, 2024 (6 months ago)
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Description: Vulnerability type
XSS
Description
vue-i18n can be passed locale messages to createI18n or useI18n.
we can then translate them using t and $t.
vue-i18n has its own syntax for local messages, and uses a message compiler to generate AST.
In order to maximize the performance of the translation function, vue-i18n uses bundler plugins such as @intlify/unplugin-vue-i18n and bulder to convert the AST in advance when building the application.
By using that AST as the locale message, it is no longer necessary to compile, and it is possible to translate using the AST.
The AST generated by the message compiler has special properties for each node in the AST tree to maximize performance. In the PoC example below, it is a static property, but that is just one of the optimizations.
About details of special properties, see https://github.com/intlify/vue-i18n/blob/master/packages/message-compiler/src/nodes.ts
In general, the locale messages of vue-i18n are optimized during production builds using @intlify/unplugin-vue-i18n,
so there is always a property that is attached during optimization like this time.
But if you are using a locale message AST in development mode or your own, there is a possibility of XSS if a third party injects.
Reproduce (PoC)
vue-i18n XSS
/**
* Prototype pollution vulnerability with `Object.prototype`.
* The 'static' property is part of the optimized AST generated by the vue-i18n message compiler.
* About...
December 3rd, 2024 (6 months ago)
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Description: Vulnerability type
XSS
Description
vue-i18n can be passed locale messages to createI18n or useI18n.
we can then translate them using t and $t.
vue-i18n has its own syntax for local messages, and uses a message compiler to generate AST.
In order to maximize the performance of the translation function, vue-i18n uses bundler plugins such as @intlify/unplugin-vue-i18n and bulder to convert the AST in advance when building the application.
By using that AST as the locale message, it is no longer necessary to compile, and it is possible to translate using the AST.
The AST generated by the message compiler has special properties for each node in the AST tree to maximize performance. In the PoC example below, it is a static property, but that is just one of the optimizations.
About details of special properties, see https://github.com/intlify/vue-i18n/blob/master/packages/message-compiler/src/nodes.ts
In general, the locale messages of vue-i18n are optimized during production builds using @intlify/unplugin-vue-i18n,
so there is always a property that is attached during optimization like this time.
But if you are using a locale message AST in development mode or your own, there is a possibility of XSS if a third party injects.
Reproduce (PoC)
vue-i18n XSS
/**
* Prototype pollution vulnerability with `Object.prototype`.
* The 'static' property is part of the optimized AST generated by the vue-i18n message compiler.
* About...
December 3rd, 2024 (6 months ago)
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Description: Vulnerability type: Prototype Pollution
Affected Package:
Product: @intlify/shared
Version: 10.0.4
Vulnerability Location(s):
node_modules/@intlify/shared/dist/shared.cjs:232:26
Description:
The latest version of @intlify/shared (10.0.4) is vulnerable to Prototype Pollution through the entry function(s) lib.deepCopy. An attacker can supply a payload with Object.prototype setter to introduce or modify properties within the global prototype chain, causing denial of service (DoS) the minimum consequence.
Moreover, the consequences of this vulnerability can escalate to other injection-based attacks, depending on how the library integrates within the application. For instance, if the polluted property propagates to sensitive Node.js APIs (e.g., exec, eval), it could enable an attacker to execute arbitrary commands within the application's context.
PoC:
// install the package with the latest version
~$ npm install @intlify/[email protected]
// run the script mentioned below
~$ node poc.js
//The expected output (if the code still vulnerable) is below.
// Note that the output may slightly differs from function to another.
Before Attack: {}
After Attack: {"pollutedKey":123}
(async () => {
const lib = await import('@intlify/shared');
var someObj = {}
console.log("Before Attack: ", JSON.stringify({}.__proto__));
try {
// for multiple functions, uncomment only one for each execution.
lib.deepCopy (JSON.parse('{"__proto__":{"pollutedKey":123}}'), someObj)
} catch (e) { }
console.lo...
December 3rd, 2024 (6 months ago)
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Description: Vulnerability type: Prototype Pollution
Affected Package:
Product: @intlify/shared
Version: 10.0.4
Vulnerability Location(s):
node_modules/@intlify/shared/dist/shared.cjs:232:26
Description:
The latest version of @intlify/shared (10.0.4) is vulnerable to Prototype Pollution through the entry function(s) lib.deepCopy. An attacker can supply a payload with Object.prototype setter to introduce or modify properties within the global prototype chain, causing denial of service (DoS) the minimum consequence.
Moreover, the consequences of this vulnerability can escalate to other injection-based attacks, depending on how the library integrates within the application. For instance, if the polluted property propagates to sensitive Node.js APIs (e.g., exec, eval), it could enable an attacker to execute arbitrary commands within the application's context.
PoC:
// install the package with the latest version
~$ npm install @intlify/[email protected]
// run the script mentioned below
~$ node poc.js
//The expected output (if the code still vulnerable) is below.
// Note that the output may slightly differs from function to another.
Before Attack: {}
After Attack: {"pollutedKey":123}
(async () => {
const lib = await import('@intlify/shared');
var someObj = {}
console.log("Before Attack: ", JSON.stringify({}.__proto__));
try {
// for multiple functions, uncomment only one for each execution.
lib.deepCopy (JSON.parse('{"__proto__":{"pollutedKey":123}}'), someObj)
} catch (e) { }
console.lo...
December 3rd, 2024 (6 months ago)
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Description: Vulnerability type: Prototype Pollution
Affected Package:
Product: @intlify/shared
Version: 10.0.4
Vulnerability Location(s):
node_modules/@intlify/shared/dist/shared.cjs:232:26
Description:
The latest version of @intlify/shared (10.0.4) is vulnerable to Prototype Pollution through the entry function(s) lib.deepCopy. An attacker can supply a payload with Object.prototype setter to introduce or modify properties within the global prototype chain, causing denial of service (DoS) the minimum consequence.
Moreover, the consequences of this vulnerability can escalate to other injection-based attacks, depending on how the library integrates within the application. For instance, if the polluted property propagates to sensitive Node.js APIs (e.g., exec, eval), it could enable an attacker to execute arbitrary commands within the application's context.
PoC:
// install the package with the latest version
~$ npm install @intlify/[email protected]
// run the script mentioned below
~$ node poc.js
//The expected output (if the code still vulnerable) is below.
// Note that the output may slightly differs from function to another.
Before Attack: {}
After Attack: {"pollutedKey":123}
(async () => {
const lib = await import('@intlify/shared');
var someObj = {}
console.log("Before Attack: ", JSON.stringify({}.__proto__));
try {
// for multiple functions, uncomment only one for each execution.
lib.deepCopy (JSON.parse('{"__proto__":{"pollutedKey":123}}'), someObj)
} catch (e) { }
console.lo...
December 3rd, 2024 (6 months ago)
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Description: Vulnerability type: Prototype Pollution
Affected Package:
Product: @intlify/shared
Version: 10.0.4
Vulnerability Location(s):
node_modules/@intlify/shared/dist/shared.cjs:232:26
Description:
The latest version of @intlify/shared (10.0.4) is vulnerable to Prototype Pollution through the entry function(s) lib.deepCopy. An attacker can supply a payload with Object.prototype setter to introduce or modify properties within the global prototype chain, causing denial of service (DoS) the minimum consequence.
Moreover, the consequences of this vulnerability can escalate to other injection-based attacks, depending on how the library integrates within the application. For instance, if the polluted property propagates to sensitive Node.js APIs (e.g., exec, eval), it could enable an attacker to execute arbitrary commands within the application's context.
PoC:
// install the package with the latest version
~$ npm install @intlify/[email protected]
// run the script mentioned below
~$ node poc.js
//The expected output (if the code still vulnerable) is below.
// Note that the output may slightly differs from function to another.
Before Attack: {}
After Attack: {"pollutedKey":123}
(async () => {
const lib = await import('@intlify/shared');
var someObj = {}
console.log("Before Attack: ", JSON.stringify({}.__proto__));
try {
// for multiple functions, uncomment only one for each execution.
lib.deepCopy (JSON.parse('{"__proto__":{"pollutedKey":123}}'), someObj)
} catch (e) { }
console.lo...
December 3rd, 2024 (6 months ago)
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Description: Versions of the library from 0.2.2 to 1.0.9 are vulnerable to the arbitrary code execution due to unsafe usage of new Function(...) in the module that handles points format. Applications passing the 3rd parameter to the hull function without sanitising may be impacted. The vulnerability has been fixed in version 1.0.10, please update the library. Check project homepage on GitHub to see how to fetch the latest version: https://github.com/andriiheonia/hull?tab=readme-ov-file#npm-package
References
https://github.com/AndriiHeonia/hull/security/advisories/GHSA-q849-wxrc-vqrp
https://github.com/AndriiHeonia/hull/commit/9de6f9549b74fbb68bf4d5a449147b4c1d7cda0a
https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q849-wxrc-vqrp
December 3rd, 2024 (6 months ago)
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Description: Impact
A vulnerability is identified in Backstage Scaffolder template functionality where Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) can be exploited to perform Git config injection. The vulnerability allows an attacker to capture privileged git tokens used by the Backstage Scaffolder plugin. With these tokens, unauthorized access to sensitive resources in git can be achieved. The impact is considered medium severity as the Backstage Threat Model recommends restricting access to adding and editing templates in the Backstage Catalog plugin.
Patches
The issue has been resolved in versions v0.4.12, v0.5.1 and v0.6.1 of the @backstage/plugin-scaffolder-node package. Users are encouraged to upgrade to this version to mitigate the vulnerability.
Workarounds
Users can ensure that templates do not change git config.
References
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
Open an issue in the Backstage repository
Visit our Discord, linked to in Backstage README
References
https://github.com/backstage/backstage/security/advisories/GHSA-qmc2-jpr5-7rg9
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-53983
https://github.com/backstage/backstage/tree/master/plugins/scaffolder-node
https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qmc2-jpr5-7rg9
December 3rd, 2024 (6 months ago)
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Description: Mongoose before 8.8.3 can improperly use $where in match.
References
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-53900
https://github.com/Automattic/mongoose/commit/c9e86bff7eef477da75a29af62a06d41a835a156
https://github.com/Automattic/mongoose/blob/master/CHANGELOG.md
https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-m7xq-9374-9rvx
December 3rd, 2024 (6 months ago)
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