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Threat and Vulnerability Intelligence Database
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Description: The FTC claims that the Web hosting company's security failures led to several major breaches in the past few years.
January 16th, 2025 (6 months ago)
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CVE-2024-50633 |
Description: A Broken Object Level Authorization (BOLA) vulnerability in Indico v3.2.9 allows attackers to access sensitive information via sending a crafted POST request to the component /api/principals.
References
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-50633
https://github.com/cetinpy/CVE-2024-50633
https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-3wg7-r7q5-r2jf
EPSS Score: 0.04%
January 16th, 2025 (6 months ago)
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Description: A severe flaw in the W3 Total Cache plugin installed on more than one million WordPress sites could give attackers access to various information, including metadata on cloud-based apps. [...]
January 16th, 2025 (6 months ago)
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Description: Impact
MMR before version 1.3.5 allows, by design, unauthenticated remote participants to trigger a download and caching of remote media from a remote homeserver to the local media repository. Such content then also becomes available for download from the local homeserver in an unauthenticated way. The implication is that unauthenticated remote adversaries can use this functionality to plant problematic content into the media repository.
Patches
MMR 1.3.5 introduces a partial mitigation in the form of new endpoints which require authentication for media downloads. The unauthenticated endpoints will be frozen in a future release, closing the attack vector.
Workarounds
Though extremely limited, server operators can use more strict rate limits based on IP address.
References
https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-spec-proposals/pull/3916
References
https://github.com/t2bot/matrix-media-repo/security/advisories/GHSA-8vmr-h7h5-cqhg
https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-spec-proposals/pull/3916
https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8vmr-h7h5-cqhg
January 16th, 2025 (6 months ago)
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Description: Impact
MMR before version 1.3.5 is vulnerable to unbounded disk consumption, where an unauthenticated adversary can induce it to download and cache large amounts of remote media files.
MMR's typical operating environment uses S3-like storage as a backend, with file-backed store as an alternative option. Instances using a file-backed store or those which self-host an S3 storage system are therefore vulnerable to a disk fill attack. Once the disk is full, authenticated users will be unable to upload new media, resulting in denial of service.
For instances configured to use a cloud-based S3 storage option, this could result in high service fees instead of a denial of service.
Patches
MMR 1.3.5 introduces a new default-on "leaky bucket" rate limit to reduce the amount of data a user can request at a time. This does not fully address the issue, but does limit an unauthenticated user's ability to request large amounts of data.
Operators should note that the leaky bucket implementation introduced in MMR 1.3.5 requires the IP address associated with the request to be forwarded, to avoid mistakenly applying the rate limit to the reverse proxy instead. To avoid this issue, the reverse proxy should populate the X-Forwarded-For header when sending the request to MMR.
Workarounds
Operators may wish to lower the maximum file size they allow and implement harsh rate limits, though this can still lead to a large amount of data to be downloaded.
References
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Le...
January 16th, 2025 (6 months ago)
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Description: Impact
MMR makes requests to other servers as part of normal operation, and these resource owners can return large amounts of JSON back to MMR for parsing. In parsing, MMR can consume large amounts of memory and exhaust available memory.
Patches
This is fixed in MMR v1.3.8.
Workarounds
Forward proxies can be configured to block requests to unsafe hosts. Alternatively, MMR processes can be configured with memory limits and auto-restart. Running multiple MMR processes concurrently can help ensure a restart does not overly impact users.
References
https://github.com/t2bot/matrix-media-repo/security/advisories/GHSA-gp86-q8hg-fpxj
https://github.com/t2bot/matrix-media-repo/releases/tag/v1.3.8
https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gp86-q8hg-fpxj
January 16th, 2025 (6 months ago)
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Description: Impact
Matrix Media Repo (MMR) is vulnerable to server-side request forgery, serving content from a private network it can access, under certain conditions.
Patches
This is fixed in MMR v1.3.8.
Workarounds
Restricting which hosts MMR is allowed to contact via (local) firewall rules or a transparent proxy.
References
https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Server_Side_Request_Forgery
https://learn.snyk.io/lesson/ssrf-server-side-request-forgery/
https://www.agwa.name/blog/post/preventing_server_side_request_forgery_in_golang
References
https://github.com/t2bot/matrix-media-repo/security/advisories/GHSA-r6jg-jfv6-2fjv
https://github.com/t2bot/matrix-media-repo/releases/tag/v1.3.8
https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r6jg-jfv6-2fjv
January 16th, 2025 (6 months ago)
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Description: Impact
If SVG or JPEGXL thumbnailers are enabled (they are disabled by default), a user may upload a file which claims to be either of these types and request a thumbnail to invoke a different decoder in ImageMagick. In some ImageMagick installations, this includes the capability to run Ghostscript to decode the image/file.
If MP4 thumbnailers are enabled (also disabled by default), the same issue as above may occur with the ffmpeg installation instead.
MMR uses a number of other decoders for all other file types when preparing thumbnails. Theoretical issues are possible with these decoders, however in testing they were not possible to exploit.
Patches
This is fixed in MMR v1.3.8. MMR now inspects the mimetype of media prior to thumbnailing, and picks a thumbnailer based on those results instead of relying on user-supplied values. This may lead to fewer thumbnails when obscure file shapes are used. This also helps narrow scope of theoretical issues with all decoders MMR uses for thumbnails.
Workarounds
Disabling the SVG, JPEGXL, and MP4 thumbnail types in the MMR config prevents the decoders from being invoked. Further disabling uncommon file types on the server is recommended to limit risk surface.
Containers and other similar technologies may also be used to limit the impact of vulnerabilities in external decoders, like ImageMagick and ffmpeg.
Some installations of ImageMagick may disable "unsafe" file types, like PDFs, already. This option can be replicated to other e...
January 16th, 2025 (6 months ago)
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Description: Microsoft has expanded its Windows 11 administrator protection tests, allowing Insiders to enable the security feature from the Windows Security settings. [...]
January 16th, 2025 (6 months ago)
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Description: Bill discusses how to find 'the helpers' and the importance of knowledge sharing. Plus, there's a lot to talk about in our latest vulnerability roundup.
January 16th, 2025 (6 months ago)
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