Threat and Vulnerability Intelligence Database
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Known Exploited
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Description: A Threat Actor Claims to be Selling Data of VPbet
December 18th, 2024 (4 months ago)
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Description: ​Recorded Future, an American threat intelligence company, has become the first cybersecurity firm designated by the Russian government as an "undesirable" organization. [...]
December 18th, 2024 (4 months ago)
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Description: A Threat Actor Claims to be Selling Access to Unidentified Leading Technology Companies in Israel Containing 3TB of Data
December 18th, 2024 (4 months ago)
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Description: A Threat Actor is Allegedly Selling Windows Privilege Escalation Malware
December 18th, 2024 (4 months ago)
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Description: miyako is Allegedly Selling Firewall Root Access of Germany City Government
December 18th, 2024 (4 months ago)
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Description: Impact
Impacted are the only ones who use hd_wallet::Slip10Like or slip_10 derivation method instantiated with curves other than secp256k1 and secp256r1.
hd_wallet crate used to provide Slip10Like derivation method, which is also provided in slip-10 crate as a default derivation method. It's based on slip10 method that searches for a valid child key in an infinite loop until it's found.
Theoretically, this could be exploited by an attacker by finding a derivation path that would force someone to execute a lot of iterations of this loop to find a valid child key. This attack, however, requires the probability of getting an invalid scalar from random 32 bytes to be high. Slip10 is protected from this attack as it's only defined on secp256k1 and secp256r1 curves, for which such probability is very low:
For secp256k1, probability is $< 2^{-127}$. This means that a loop with 2 or more iterations is vanishingly impossible.
For secp256r1, probability is $< 2^{-32}$. This means that a loop with 5 or more iterations is vanishingly impossible.
While standard curves are safe to use with slip10, we used to allow slip10-like derivation which can be instantiated with any curve. For instance, one could instantiate it with ed25519 or stark curves, for which probability of getting invalid scalar from random 32 bytes is >90%, so theoretically, attacker could try to DoS such construction.
Patches
hd_wallet v0.6.0 has been patched by removing slip10-like derivation from public API.
If y...
December 18th, 2024 (4 months ago)
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Description: Impact
Impacted are the only ones who use hd_wallet::Slip10Like or slip_10 derivation method instantiated with curves other than secp256k1 and secp256r1.
hd_wallet crate used to provide Slip10Like derivation method, which is also provided in slip-10 crate as a default derivation method. It's based on slip10 method that searches for a valid child key in an infinite loop until it's found.
Theoretically, this could be exploited by an attacker by finding a derivation path that would force someone to execute a lot of iterations of this loop to find a valid child key. This attack, however, requires the probability of getting an invalid scalar from random 32 bytes to be high. Slip10 is protected from this attack as it's only defined on secp256k1 and secp256r1 curves, for which such probability is very low:
For secp256k1, probability is $< 2^{-127}$. This means that a loop with 2 or more iterations is vanishingly impossible.
For secp256r1, probability is $< 2^{-32}$. This means that a loop with 5 or more iterations is vanishingly impossible.
While standard curves are safe to use with slip10, we used to allow slip10-like derivation which can be instantiated with any curve. For instance, one could instantiate it with ed25519 or stark curves, for which probability of getting invalid scalar from random 32 bytes is >90%, so theoretically, attacker could try to DoS such construction.
Patches
hd_wallet v0.6.0 has been patched by removing slip10-like derivation from public API.
If y...
December 18th, 2024 (4 months ago)
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Description: Summary
jsii is a TypeScript to JavaScript compiler that also extracts an interface definition manifest to generate RPC stubs in various programming languages. jsii is typically used as a command-line tool, but it can also be loaded as a library.
When loaded as a library into a larger application, prototype pollution may happen if untrusted user input is passed to the library. When used as a command line-tool, this pollution cannot occur.
Impact
You may be impacted if you have written an application that loads jsii as a library, and passes untrusted user input into the jsii.configureCategories() function. In that case, a user can craft input in such a way that, following the invocation, a field named "category" with a user-controlled value is added to the JavaScript Object prototype. This will cause every object in the program (both new and existing) to have a field named "category", even if it shouldn't.
This will not affect jsii itself, but it might affect the application you have loaded jsii into.
The function jsii.configureCategories() is used to configure the severity (error, warning, etc.) of various jsii diagnostics.
Impacted versions: <=5.7.2, <=5.6.3, <=5.5.14, <=5.4.45
Example:
const jsii = require('jsii');
// prints 'undefined'
console.log(JSON.stringify({}.category))
// calling 'configureCategories' with user input
jsii.configureCategories(JSON.parse('{"__proto__": "user-input"}'))
// from this point onwards, every single object literal in the program
//...
December 18th, 2024 (4 months ago)
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Description: A Threat Actor is Allegedly Selling RDP Access to an Unidentified Business Services Company in Austria
December 18th, 2024 (4 months ago)
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Description: Interpol calls on the cybersecurity community, law enforcement, and the media to stop using the term "Pig Butchering" when referring to online relationship and investment scams, as it unnecessarily shames the victims impacted by these fraud campaigns. [...]
December 18th, 2024 (4 months ago)
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